3 ambiguous meanings, able "to communicate only its own inability to communicate." 4 Today, one might say, the text often appears in the guise of a fluid, boundless entity lacking both author and stable meaning.
Positivists and presentists might suggest that how we conceive of a text and its meaning makes little difference to our historical practice. A belief in brute facts or the immanence of meaning in the text might encourage them to argue that texts present the past to us irrespective of any abstract analysis of textuality. Yet surely we can not doubt that different concepts of the text often inspire different types of historical practice; indeed, positivism and presentation should be seen as particular analyses of textuality capable of informing certain types of historical practice rather than as neutral meta-theories. As an example we might point to theoretically-inspired readings of John Locke's Two Treatises of Government as diverse as Leo Strauss's emphasis on his place within the canon, C. B. Macpherson's deployment of economic determinism, and John Dunn's rigorous contextualism. 5 The questions of what a text is and of how a text possesses meaning are worth asking both for their intrinsic philosophical interest and for their relevance to historical practice. Historians necessarily idealise texts and textual meanings in that they in part construct them through their explicit or implicit theories of textuality. It is important, therefore, that the relevant theories be adequate ones. To ensure such adequacy we need to grasp a number of conceptual distinctions. We must distinguish between a physical object, a meaningful object, a work, and a text. More particularly, we will find that all meanings are either meanings for specific people or abstractions based on such meanings. This implies that we should renounce the metaphysical concept of the text as an object that possesses an innate meaning. Physical objects become meaningful objects only because specific individuals intend or understand 4 them to possess a meaning. The only viable analysis of the text, therefore, is of a physical object that acts as the site of various works: the text is a physical object to which various individuals have attached, probably different, meanings. This analysis of the text enables us to resolve various difficulties about the stability of text and the relation between authorial intention and textual meaning.
On Meaning
Think of a text; think, for example, of Locke's Two Treatises, more specifically, think of the 1978 paperback Everyman's Library edition introduced by W. S. Carpenter. This text is physical object: it has a yellow dust jacket with a picture of Locke on it; it has 258 pages; and it is covered with black printed marks.
Sometimes we can not provide such clear accounts of the physical nature of a text because it is one we postulate. We do not have, for example, a single manuscript or book that we would describe without equivocation as Locke's own text of the Two Treatises. Instead we postulate Locke's own version of the text, and, through bibliographic and textual scholarship, we then try to improve our knowledge of this postulated object. 6 When we postulate texts, however, we characteristically give them a physical form. We would be unhappy with the idea that Locke's own text of the Two Treatises existed only in his head; if it did, we would not want to call it a text.
Think now of a physical object that most of us would regard as devoid of meaning at least in itself; think, for example, of a cloud. Straightaway we will realise that texts are never just physical objects; they are meaningful ones. Indeed, some scholars define the concept of a text broadly to cover every physical object that bears meaning, including, paintings, actions, and even tools produced by human activity.
Whether we accept this broad definition or restrict the concept of a text to those 5 physical objects that include words will make no real difference to what follows. The ensuing arguments will focus on written documents, but they could be extended to apply to other meaningful objects. For the moment, therefore, let us say that a text is a physical object that possesses meaning. What though is a meaning?
Meanings only exist for individuals. To accept this procedural individualism is not necessarily to tie the meaning of a text irrevocably to the intention of its author; after all, the meaning a text has for a reader is still a meaning for that reader as an individual even if it differs from that intended by the author. The challenge to procedural individualism does not come from the diverse ways in which a text might be read. It comes, rather, from the existence of social meanings. Principal among such social meanings are semantic meanings, defined in terms of the truth-conditions of an abstract proposition, and linguistic meanings, defined in terms of the conventions that govern usage within a community. A defence of procedural individualism might begin by reducing these forms of meaning to meanings for specific individuals.
The semantic meaning of an utterance comes from what would have to be the case for it to be true. Assuming that there are no pure perceptions, what would have to be the case for an utterance to be true must be relative to a conceptual framework.
Thus, because conceptual frameworks are held only by individuals, semantic meanings can not exist apart from for individuals. Utterances can acquire a semantic meaning only within a set of concepts held by one or more individual. Semantic meanings are abstractions based on meanings for individuals. When we say that an utterance has a semantic meaning X, we imply that a group of individuals, usually including ourselves, share a conceptual framework within which they would accept the utterance as true if X is the case.
6
The linguistic meaning of a word comes from the concept to which it conventionally refers: thus, the linguistic meaning of "bachelor" is an unmarried man.
The bond between a word and the concept that constitutes its linguistic meaning is, moreover, a purely conventional one without any natural foundation: thus, social convention could decree that the word "bac" rather than "bachelor" refer to an unmarried man. 7 Although some words seem to be a peculiarly apt expression for a given concept, as in cases of onomatopoeia, even here there could be a convention that bound a different word to the relevant concept. Because linguistic meanings are thus purely conventional, they are given simply by what individuals do and do not accept as a convention. They exist because a number of individuals take certain words to refer to certain concepts. 8 Linguistic meanings are abstractions based on meanings for individuals. When we say that an utterance has a linguistic meaning X, we imply that a group of individuals accept certain conventions under which they understand it to refer to X.
Although we can reduce semantic and linguistic meanings to meanings for individuals, critics might suggest that there is another form of meaning that we can not so reduce. In considering this possibility, we can contrast an intentional meaning, defined as the meaning an utterance has for a particular individual, with any structural or innate meaning a text might possess that we could not reduce to intentional ones.
We can approach utterances in one of two ways depending on which sort of meaning interests us, or better whether or not we believe in structural or innate meanings. 9 If we want to know about an intentional meaning or an abstraction based on intentional meanings, we will consider an utterance as a historical work, that is, as a set of words written, or spoken, or understood in a particular way on a particular occasion. Imagine that someone in the eighteenth century wrote an essay containing a section entitled "hallelujah lass". If we try to study the essay as a reified text, we will abstract the words and phrases in it from the occasion of its appearance. When we do so, moreover, we presumably must allow for the fact that the phrase "hallelujah lass"
can refer to a female member of the Salvation Army. The structural or innate meaning of the reified text refers to a female member of the Salvation Army. Clearly, therefore, the text does not exist in time -it must be outside of our world. After all, if
we try to ascribe a temporal existence to the reified text, we will find that an essay written in the eighteenth century referred to an organisation that was not established until the late nineteenth century. We will be stuck with an unacceptable anachronism.
In order to locate a reified text in time, we would have to appeal to something outside of it, but as soon as we do this, we switch our attention from the reified text and its structural or innate meaning to a work and its intentional meaning. Imagine that we have two essays, one written in the eighteenth century and one written in the twentieth century, that contain exactly the same words and punctuation in exactly the same order. Any fact enabling us to distinguish between the meaning of the two essays would have to refer to the particular occasion of the appearance of one or other of them. It would have to be a fact about the essays as works, not reified texts.
Because the two essays are identical, moreover, they must share any structural or innate meaning they possess. Thus, if the twentieth century essay contains a section headed "hallelujah lass" so that "a female member of the Salvation Army" is part of its supposedly structural or innate meaning, the reified text of the eighteenth century essay also must include mention of the Salvation Army. Once again, therefore, we can not ascribe a temporal existence to reified texts without falling into anachronism.
We can not do so because reified texts do not have a historical existence. As soon as we consider an utterance as a historical object, we necessarily focus our attention on its intentional meaning as a work. The obvious way to fix an utterance in history is to consider the meaning it had for certain people. We might say, for example, that our two identical essays have different meanings because the words they contain meant different things to people in the eighteenth and twentieth centuries. To ask about the meaning an utterance had for a particular group of people, however, is to ask about the meaning of various works. To ask what the essay meant to people in the eighteenth century is to ask how they understood the essay. We can conclude, therefore, that only intentional meanings and works have a real or temporal existence.
Meanings only exist for individuals. There is only one way to avoid procedural individualism without postulating some sort of divine or supernatural realm of which we allegedly can acquire knowledge; one must identify a language-x with a meaning-x that exists in history, as do intentional meanings, but that exists independently of particular individuals, as would structural or innate meanings.
Although some scholars have tried to defend something akin to language-x, their endeavours seem doomed to fail. 11 Consider what is involved in abandoning the idea that temporal meanings exist only for individuals. When we talk of a social language, we typically have in mind a set of inter-subjective meanings shared by various people.
For example, when two people talk of a female friend who is a member of the Salvation Army by saying "Jane is a Hallelujah Lass," they share a set of meanings 9 that constitute the language they use to communicate. Although we might describe their shared language as a social structure, we would not thereby commit ourselves to the claim that it exists independently of particular individuals. On the contrary, it exists only because they, as individuals, share certain meanings. Because language-x does not embody this sort of inter-subjectivity, its ontological status remains extremely vague. It can not be a concrete entity; nor can it be an emergent entity, since if it were it would have to emerge from facts about individuals. Language-x must exist independently of human thought, since our thoughts are facts about us as individuals. Language-x must be a Platonic form; it must be an abstract entity with a real and independent existence. Although Platonic forms have had an honoured place in the history of philosophy, a (post)modern suspicion of the very possibility of selfevident truths makes a belief in them hard to defend. Besides, the opponents of procedural individualism would face special difficulties since their need to defend a language-x that exists in time would require them to ascribe a temporal existence to a Platonic form. They would have to explain how a Platonic form can exist for some time and then wither. How can a Platonic form be subject to natural processes such as those of growth and decay? Surely any theory of meaning that found itself having to answer this question would have gone wildly astray. we must use language to describe them and we always can ask about the meaning of the words we so use. Although we can use various combinations of words to describe an intention, however, it remains the same whatever words we use to describe it.
Post-structuralists sometimes argue that we can not have knowledge of intentions precisely because they exist outside of language whereas we always remain within language. As Derrida puts it, there is only writing, "there is no 'outside' to the text." 16 Here too, however, the rhetoric of post-structuralism has an unfortunate 13 tendency to slide from arguments for a weak claim which is true to a defence of a strong claim which is false. Few people would deny the weak claim that we must use language, conceived as a set of signs, if we are to refer to anything at all. But this weak claim does not establish the strong claim that we can not penetrate the linguistic fog to acquire knowledge of the things to which our signs refer. On the contrary, if our signs refer to reality, presumably we can have knowledge of reality. The real issue, therefore, is whether or not our signs refer to reality. The post-structuralists who argue we can not have knowledge of anything outside of language must do so on the grounds that our language does not refer to reality. But this seems highly implausible. After all, even if we accept that our concepts do not have a one to one correspondence with reality, we still could argue that they can refer to reality within a theoretical context. 17 As a last resort, post-structuralists sometimes accept that we can penetrate the linguistic fog engulfing reality only to deny that we thereby can acquire knowledge of intentional meanings. Derrida, for example, occasionally suggests that intentions are "in principle inaccessible" because we can not know anything about other people's minds. 18 Behaviourists can rebut this argument easily. Given that we define psychological concepts by reference to actual or possible behaviour, we can have knowledge of intentions simply because we can observe behaviour. The fact that we can not know other minds is irrelevant because intentions are not mental states.
Mentalists too can rebut this argument provided only that they reject logical empiricism. The post-structuralists' position derives from the twin assertions that we can know things only if we perceive them directly and that we can not perceive other minds directly. Yet the logical empiricism contained in these assertions does scant justice to our everyday notion of experience. When we say that we have experienced 14 something, we imply that it exists and that we have had sensations we could not have had if it did not exist, but we do not necessarily imply that we have perceived it in itself. For instance, if we say that we have experienced radio waves, we imply that they exist and that we have listened to the radio, but we do not imply that we have perceived radio waves directly. We imply that we have heard the sounds the radio waves produce in our ear, not the radio waves themselves. Thus, provided mentalists accept our everyday, realist understanding of experience, they too can argue that we can have knowledge of other people's minds. They can say that we have knowledge of other people's minds because we encounter their minds indirectly in their behaviour.
So, we can accept that a text is ambiguous, being the site of various works, without thereby concluding that it is unknowable. Reception theorists, however, suggest that the ambiguous nature of texts renders them unstable in the sense of being indeterminate rather than unknowable. Yet we have no reason as yet to accept this argument. We have found only that texts are ambiguous because they are sites of various works, not that they are indeterminate because we can not identify the works of which they are composed. Reception theorists argue that we can not determine the content of a text because the historicity of our being precludes our escaping from our particular historical horizon. Many reception theorists refer us here to Hans-Georg
Gadamer's analysis of historical knowledge as dependent on "the inner historicity that belongs to experience itself," an analysis that itself points back to Wilhelm Dilthey's belief that a historical event "gains meaning from its relationship with the whole, from the connection between past and future." 19 However, whereas Gadamer's followers often take him to have proven the irrelevance and futility of any attempt to fix a text, he himself focused on the implications of human ontology for understanding as such.
His concern lay less with the specific methodological problems we face in acquiring encouraging further reflection, and leading us to revise our beliefs. In no area of human knowledge does the likelihood of our thus revising our beliefs imply that the objects we currently postulate are unstable.
Texts and Authors
A text is a physical object that acts as a site at which one or more individual locates a work. So defined, a text is an ambiguous but stable entity with, at any given moment, a determinate content available for historical study. This definition of a text also enables us to resolve difficulties in the concept of an author and the relationship of authorial intention to textual meaning. Alongside post-structuralism, deconstruction, and reception theory, there has arisen an increasing awareness of the difficulties of postulating, let alone identifying, authors for texts such as the Iliad or a "keep off the grass" sign. In our view, a text is a physical object that people transform into a meaningful one by attaching works to it. This analysis of the text points to a distinction between the creator of the text as a physical object -that which causes it to come into being -and the author of the text as an utterance -the person who first ascribes meaning to the relevant physical object. Once we grasp this distinction, we surely will conclude that although any text will have a creator and an author, the two need not be the same.
Our definition of the text, with its implicit distinction between creator and author, enables us to postulate authors for problematic texts such as the Iliad or a "keep off the grass" sign. Consider texts with a composite author or multiple authors.
In these cases, we can distinguish the creators of the individual bits of the text from the author who first collected these bits together in a single text. We can distinguish the numerous people we suppose played an active role in the oral tradition out of which the Iliad emerged from the author or authors who first wrote down and attached a meaning to the particular version of concern to us. Of course, if we are interested in a component part of a text, we might turn our attention to an author other than the author of the whole. No doubt, for example, the author of St John's Gospel was not also the author of the Bible. Similarly, although we standardly ascribe the meaning of a co-authored text to all the authors, we might focus on a component part that we ascribe to just one of them. Consider next simple texts that recur as, for instance, with common public notices. Some scholars have argued that signs such as "keep off the grass" do not have authors. 21 We might allow that public notices often are created by machines: after all, there is something odd about the idea that they could be created by someone who never sees them nor touches them, such as the person who first put up a sign saying "keep off the grass" or the person who programmes a machine to produce a hundred such signs. Because printing machines can not ascribe meanings to objects, moreover, we might allow also that the creators of public notices often are not their authors. Nonetheless, we still need not conclude that such notices do not have authors. We can say instead that the author of such a notice is the person who first ascribes meaning to it, even when this implies that the notice existed as a physical object for sometime before its author constituted as a meaningful text. The case of apparently accidental texts, such as the imagined example of the monkey who types
Hamlet, closely resembles that of public notices. 22 We have the monkey who creates the Hamlet manuscript as a physical object and Shakespeare who first made any such utterance, but neither seems suitable as the author of the manuscript; rather, we can say that the author is the person who first ascribes meaning to it.
In many cases, the author of a text is also its creator. Sometimes, however, the creator does not ascribe any meaning to the creation and so can not be the author of a meaningful text. The author of the text in these cases is the person who first ascribes meaning to it. This separation of author and creator will seem paradoxical only if we wrongly reduced the meaning of a text to the conscious, prior purposes of its author.
If we did this, we would set up a rigid distinction between author and reader in a way which would encourage us to equate authorship with creation. In contrast, once we recognise that a text is just a site at which various individuals locate diverse meanings, we can allow that authors and readers ascribe meanings to texts in similar processes.
Doing this, moreover, encourages us to distinguish the ascription of meaning from the act of creation. There is nothing paradoxical, therefore, in the idea that the author of an utterance might be, not its creator, but rather the first reader to ascribe meaning to it. given authority and institutionalised not solely in reasoned debate but also in political struggles characterised by unequal relations of power.
Although our pragmatic theory of the text resembles that of the reception theorists, there are important differences here. Reception theorists often divorce the meaning of a text entirely from the intentions of its author. Sometimes they draw on a phenomenological scepticism to suggest that historians understand the past only in a dialogue with it and that this precludes a focus on authorial intentions. 26 According to phenomenological sceptics, the way in which readers understand a text reflects their presuppositions. 27 Reception theorists imply that this phenomenological scepticism shows that we can never recover the authorial intention behind a text, so we should concentrate on the meaning of the text as it has been produced by a continuous stream of creative readings. Yet phenomenological scepticism can not do the work reception theorists here ask it to. If we can not have access to past meanings, we can not recover the ways in which readers responded to texts as well as authorial intentions.
There are only two viable responses to phenomenological scepticism. The first is: if we believe that the limitations of human understanding make history impossible, we will focus solely on what texts mean to us, knowing full well that we can not recover either the intentions of the authors of these texts or the meanings these texts have had for past readers. 28 The second is: if we think that the limits of human understanding make history difficult but not impossible, we will try to recover the meaning of texts to authors and readers alike.
Reception theory seems to be on firmer ground when it relies solely on the suggestion that the study of texts can not just be a study of authorial intentions. Even here, however, reception-theory is lopsided. Imagine that historians want to write a study of the ways in which readers have understood a the Two Treatises through the ages. When historians want to know what someone took the Two Treatises to mean, they will study the writings, or possibly the actions, of that person. They still focus on authorial intentions; it is just the relevant authorial intentions now lie in the texts in which the readers of the Two Treatises expressed their understanding of it. In this way, whenever we shift our focus away from the author, we turn our attention to another work, and presumably another text, so we can talk of the meaning of a work being bound by the intentions of its author. Again, because every time people read a 22 text, they create a new meaning, we can talk about every reading of a text producing a new work with a meaning composed of the intention of the reader. Reception theorists are far too ardent in their attacks on the author.
Even if our pragmatic theory of the text does not quite restrict the role of the historian to the recovery of authorial intentions, it definitely allows us to declare some ways of approaching texts to be ahistorical. Procedural individualism requires a historian who wants to ascribe a meaning to a text to specify for whom it had that meaning. Because texts do not have structural or innate meanings, any claim that a text had a meaning must entail a claim that it did so for one or more individual who at least in principle could be specified. Thus, the ascription of a meaning to a text is ahistorical if the individual for whom it had that meaning is not a historical person.
There is nothing wrong with scholars saying that a text means something to them or their contemporaries: it is just that these meanings are not properly historical. There is nothing wrong with scholars finding interesting ideas in a text and writing about these ideas: it is just that unless they give evidence to suggest a historical person understood the utterance to convey these ideas, these meanings too will not be properly historical.
As historians, we must study meanings that actually existed in the past; we must study works even if we do so to uncover the diverse meanings that a text has been made to bear.
Conclusion
Texts are the main source of our knowledge of the past. Yet recent debates, inspired by post-structuralism, deconstruction, and reception theory have shown the concept of a text to highly complex and contentious. Against the background of these debates, we have defended an analysis of the text as a site at which individuals locate diverse meanings. Texts are meaningful objects, not purely physical ones. Objects are never intrinsically meaningful, however; rather, they become meaningful by virtue of individuals attaching meanings to them. Every time people attach a meaning to an object, they create a work, that is, a meaningful object they associate with the relevant physical one. The text is the site at which the individuals locate their works.
Our pragmatic theory of the text overlaps with, but also differs from, those associated with post-structuralism, deconstruction, and reception theory. Consider first the question of the stability of the text. Here we accepted that the text is ambiguous while denying that it is unknowable or indeterminate. Because the text can be the site of very different works, it has no single correct meaning or even set of
meanings. Yet at any moment the text consists of a given set of works the meanings of which are fixed by the intentions of their authors. Consider next the question of the relationship of textual meaning to authorial intention. Here we echoed several insights reception theory derives from a recognition of the creative nature of the reading process. We encouraged the exploration of the changing horizon of expectations surrounding texts, the synchronic and diachronic relationships between works, and the social and cultural processes through which works and texts are produced, distributed, and accorded authority. Nonetheless, we did not follow reception theory, or post-structuralism and deconstruction, in preaching "the death of the author." 29 Because the content of a work is given by the mental activity of its author, the content of a text at any moment in time is defined by the mental activity of those individuals who have associated works with it. In a sense, therefore, to study the historical meaning of a text is always to study authorial intentions.
